U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors are continuing to evolve rather than settle into a fixed enforcement model. Over recent years, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has repeatedly revised how it regulates high-performance computing chip exports, tightening, amending, proposing, and in some cases withdrawing rules as geopolitical and industrial priorities shift.

The latest change continues that pattern. Export licensing for advanced chips is no longer defined only by broad prohibitions. BIS is moving towards a more conditional system that relies on licensing, documentation, and visibility into how products are used after export. That trend was clear when a proposed AI chip licensing regime was drafted and then rescinded in March, highlighting how fluid the compliance environment remains.

Effective 15 January 2026, BIS revised how it reviews license applications for certain advanced semiconductors destined for China. Applications involving chips such as Nvidia’s H200 and AMD’s MI325X are no longer automatically subject to a blanket presumption of denial. In limited circumstances, BIS will instead review them case by case, provided exporters can meet stricter security, reporting, and compliance requirements.

This is not a broad relaxation of controls. It is better understood as a move towards a more evidence-based and oversight-driven model that increases operational expectations for exporters, distributors, and compliance teams. Licensing decisions now depend more heavily on documented controls, structured data, and the ability to withstand ongoing scrutiny.

Key takeaways

• BIS has replaced a blanket presumption of denial with a limited case-by-case licensing path for some chip exports to China.
• Export approvals now depend on evidence. Businesses must document capacity impacts, end use, third-party testing, and compliance controls.
• Compliance does not end when a license is granted. Exporters must monitor shipments, enforce conditions, control access, and retain records.
• The rule reflects a broader shift towards transaction-specific risk review in semiconductor trade.
• Businesses that can manage licensing, documentation, and post-approval controls efficiently will be better placed as scrutiny increases.

From presumption of denial to conditional approval

BIS will now review certain license applications for advanced AI chips, including products such as the H200 and MI325X, individually rather than defaulting to blanket restriction. This creates a narrow path for some advanced semiconductor exports, typically classified under ECCN 3A090, to China and Macau.

Previously, these exports were generally subject to a presumption of denial. That still applies in several cases:

• reexports, exports from abroad, and in-country transfers of advanced AI-related items subject to the EAR and destined for Macau or any Country Group D:5 destination
• transactions involving entities headquartered in, or owned by a parent company headquartered in, Macau or a Country Group D:5 jurisdiction, even when the end user is elsewhere

These carveouts show BIS is still focused on restricting access where risk is considered higher, even while allowing limited flexibility for some direct U.S. exports. BIS has indicated that decisions will depend partly on whether exporters can show that:

• the export will not reduce global semiconductor production capacity available to U.S. customers
• the Chinese purchaser has suitable export compliance procedures, including screening controls
• the product has completed independent third-party performance and security testing in the United States

For compliance teams, this means more applications, more evidence, and more regulatory review.

The new export compliance burden: what businesses must now prove

Under the revised policy, approval depends not just on the item being exported, but on whether the exporter can prove that each condition is met and can continue to be met after shipment.

1. No impact to U.S. semiconductor capacity

The chip must already be sold in the United States when the license application is submitted. Exporters must also show that shipments will not reduce capacity available to domestic customers. Supporting information should cover:

• performance below the thresholds in the rule
• unit volumes already sold in the U.S.
• no diversion of U.S. foundry capacity for similar or more advanced chips
• aggregate shipments to China and Macau staying within the 50% cap tied to U.S. end use

This will require strong production plans, shipment records, and evidence of domestic capacity commitments.

2. No prohibited end use or restricted party involvement

Exporters must certify that the chips will not be used for military, intelligence, nuclear, missile, chemical, or biological weapons purposes. They must also confirm that no party to the transaction, including anyone with access to the chips, is restricted.

That raises expectations around:

• denied party screening for counterparties and beneficial owners
• verified end-use statements
• documented review of screening matches
• audit-ready records of end-user and end-use assessment

3. Verified Chinese customer compliance programmes

BIS expects exporters to show that Chinese purchasers maintain export compliance procedures, including screening and physical security controls to prevent diversion or unauthorised access.

Relevant records may include:

• third-party due diligence
• screening results
• compliance attestations
• access control documentation
• site security descriptions
• monitoring and governance procedures

These records need to be retained, controlled, and easy to retrieve.

4. Independent third-party testing documentation

Before shipment, chips must be tested in the United States to confirm that performance and security characteristics match what was reported. Exporters should maintain:

• testing certifications
• audit reports
• traceability linking tested items to shipped units

This evidence must be clearly linked to the relevant license application.

5. Remote end users and IaaS controls

Where chips may be accessed through cloud or data centre environments, exporters must identify and manage remote end users, not just the ultimate consignee.

They must:

• provide BIS with a list of intended remote end users in countries of concern such as Russia, North Korea, or Venezuela, or entities headquartered there
• obtain this information from the consignee or other transaction parties
• show that prohibited users will not receive remote access

Where the consignee or end user provides Infrastructure-as-a-Service, exporters must also verify that the provider will not transfer model weights or grant remote access to unauthorised users, and will comply with all restrictions.

How technology can support compliance

Case-by-case licensing increases operational complexity. Manual processes and spreadsheets are unlikely to scale when businesses must prepare detailed applications, manage records over multiple years, track license conditions, and monitor compliance after approval.

Useful capabilities include:

• workflow automation for license preparation, approvals, and compliance sign-off
• centralised export license and condition management tied to products, customers, ECCNs, and shipments
• integrated denied party and end-user screening
• structured evidence and document management for testing reports, attestations, and due diligence records
• post-license monitoring and reporting against approved quantities, destinations, and usage limits

Strategic considerations for semiconductor and AI hardware exporters

This rule may signal how export licensing develops for advanced technologies more broadly. Rather than relying only on bans or unrestricted trade, governments may increasingly favour controlled access models where transactions are permitted only if companies can prove eligibility and maintain oversight.

For exporters, that raises the standard for compliance maturity while reopening limited market access. Licensing, supply chain planning, and documentation can no longer sit in separate silos.

Best practices for the new environment

• treat export licensing as a lifecycle process, not a one-off event
• run early third-party testing trials
• align production, allocation, and licensing planning
• embed end-use and remote access controls into routine processes
• retain and link all supporting evidence from the outset
• prepare for follow-up questions and audit activity
• update internal export control procedures so they are repeatable and auditable

Conclusion

BIS’s revised semiconductor licensing policy creates a possible path forward for some advanced chip exports to China, but it also places far greater weight on evidence, internal controls, and post-license accountability.

For exporters, the challenge is no longer only determining whether an item is controlled. It is proving, through credible documentation and ongoing oversight, that each transaction can meet the conditions attached to that control framework. Businesses that strengthen their licensing workflows, screening, recordkeeping, and monitoring will be better positioned as this model continues to evolve.

About the author

Jackson Wood is Director, Industry Strategy, at Descartes within the company’s Global Trade Intelligence business unit. With more than 20 years of experience in global trade compliance and geopolitical risk management, he works across R&D, product management, and commercial operations to help develop solutions for an increasingly complex trade environment. His work focuses on helping customers navigate compliance challenges and realise greater value from Descartes’ risk and compliance solutions.